In this paper we analyze whether key investor information documents (KIDs) provided by suppliers/issuers help retail investors to understand the key characteristics of financial products. KIDs are fact sheets composed to describe the characteristics of financial products in a brief, standardized and straightforward manner. In our empirical analysis we evaluate different versions of KIDs and examine whether they meet minimum requirements in order to provide benefits for consumers. Our empirical results suggest that subjects assess KIDs of suppliers/issuers merely as moderately appropriate to grasp the key characteristics of financial products. In contrast, neutral benchmark KIDs are generally evaluated as being superior to those of suppliers/issuers which at best meet current legal requirements. We argue that a major reason for these findings is consumer policy's assumption of omni-competent subjects in line with the neoclassical idea of a Homo economicus. This assumption, however, is far from being both realistic and practical.
Introduction
Key investor information documents (hereafter KIDs) have been introduced in order to provide investors with all relevant information of an investment product at a glance, in particular with regard to associated costs, benefits, risks and rewards. These documents are intended to meet similar requirements as patient information sheets or package leaflets provided by pharmaceutical manufacturers , Podewils 2011 , Oehler 2012a , 2012b . In order to foster the "financial health" of investors KIDs are proposed to be self-explanatory and self-sufficient and they should allow retail investors to grasp all essential elements in one document which has a predefined form and length, is free of charge, regularly updated and written in plain, nontechnical language (FSA 2009 , Lannoo, 2010 . The documents must comprise information about the name of the specific product, investment objectives, past performance, performance scenarios, costs and associated charges, risks and rewards of a product (Oehler 2012a , 2012b , Schäfer and Schäfer 2013 ).
In the aftermath of the financial meltdown regulators and the general public came to realize the momentousness that investors understand the relevant aspects of financial products before they decide to invest. Miscounseling and pure commission-orientation in financial advice giving were identified as key drivers of malpractice (Kaas and Severidt 2002 , Rouette 2005 ). Up to that time unsophisticated investors needed to nearly fully rely on the expertise and honesty of bank counselors when seeking financial advice. Lengthy and incomprehensible investment prospectuses were unable to provide investors with appropriate decision-oriented information. In addition, individuals could not look through the incentive structure that bank counselors are subject to which led to investments in potentially unsuitable and inappropriate financial products.
In Germany the regulation on KIDs has become effective in 2011 with the introduction of the
Investor Protection Strengthening and Capital Market Functioning Act (Gesetz zur Stärkung des
Anlegerschutzes und Verbesserung der Funktionsfähigkeit des Kapitalmarkts) which introduced the requirement that investors receive brief and easily graspable product information on all financial instruments before contract conclusion. The executive order (WertpapierdienstleistungsVerhaltens-und Organisationsverordnung, WpDVerOV, Paragraph 5a) complements that the product information must not exceed a length of two pages in format A4 for non-complex financial instruments 1 or three pages for complex financial instruments, respectively. With the introduction of KIDs policymakers strive for the goal to enhance comparableness and transparency as well as investors' understanding of financial products.
Whether investors regard the actual KIDs provided by suppliers and/or issuers of financial products as being helpful when making investment decision has hardly been analyzed so far. In addition, it is unclear whether the introduction of KIDs has actually improved the perceived quality of the information that investors receive. Our paper addresses this gap in the literature.
This paper is based on prior research by Oehler (2012a) .
In our empirical analysis we evaluate different versions of KIDs in a survey among 274 finance students. Specifically, we include KIDs that have been published and designed by suppliers/issuer of XTFs, open-end real estate funds, fixed deposits and corporate bonds. In order to provide the students with a neutral benchmark we include benchmark KIDs as composed and designed by Oehler (2011) . Within the legal framework these benchmark KIDs are created based on the findings of consumer research and they are not influenced by the interests of financial service providers. In the survey we use a standardized questionnaire with five assessment criteria.
We chose finance students as subjects for this survey because we assume that they are specialists in the field of retail banking and finance who are familiar with the aforementioned products and should be able to assess the information in KIDs and compare the fact sheets with each other.
Our results indicate that KIDs of suppliers/issuers do not adequately help consumers to understand the key characteristics of financial products. Specifically, subjects assess these KIDs merely as moderately appropriate to convey the products' functioning, risks, return, associated costs etc. In contrast, the neutral benchmark KIDs generally outmatch the KIDs of suppliers/issuers which at best comply with the current regulatory requirements. Since our subjects are educated in the field of finance we conclude that retail investors who possess lesser financial sophistication will hardly benefit from supplier/issuer KIDs.
Our research contributes to the literature as well as to the political and public debate on consumer and investor policy alike. First, we demonstrate that the largely applied regulatory approach which assumes omni-competent subjects in line with the neoclassical idea of a Homo economicus is far from being both realistic and practical. Instead, policy makers should consider the relevant findings from research in behavioral economics and finance as well as in neuro economics.
Second, we show that the KIDs currently used in retail banking do not sufficiently enhance investors' understanding of the key characteristics of financial products. Third, by discussing our empirical results and the findings in the literature we unfold gaps in the current legislation on KIDs.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of the related literature.
Section 3 presents both the methodology and the data collected for this study while Section 4 discusses the findings. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Related Research
By and large, legislative procedures assume that consumers can either be considered as omnicompetent in the neoclassical idea of a Homo economicus or that it is possible to sufficiently educate them and provided them with enough information in order to become rational decision makers. Recent consumer research has fundamentally challenged the three core aspects of this assumption: permanent rationality/omni-competence of individuals, reduction of informational asymmetries, education to achieve full financial literacy (Oehler 2005 (Oehler , 2006 (Oehler , 2011 (Oehler , 2012a (Oehler , 2012b (Oehler , 2013a (Oehler , 2013b ).
In the neoclassical framework investors act in a competitive market, act upon the identical world/economic model, and exhibit time-varying (risk-)preferences. Following this theoretical approach the market is defined as being effectively rational ("as-if-approach"). Although this concept is obviously far from being realistic, about two-thirds of all legislations assume individuals who are utility-maximizing subjects in the sense of the theoretical concept of the Homo economicus (Micklitz 2003 , 2004 , Oehler 2013b . In fact, however, due to subjects' bounded rationality -which has been introduced to decision theory by Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1956 ) -individuals face cognitive constraints in terms of the reception and procession of information including emotional and motivational factors. Specifically, the behavioral economics and finance literature draws attention on information computation and decision making characteristics which indicate, e.g., that individuals cannot perceive and utilize numerous information units in a short period of time (information overload) (Miller 1956 , Malhotra 1984 . In fact, many decisionmaking opportunities rather lead to behavior of denial and procrastination (choice overload) (Plous 1993 , Baron 2000 . This is particularly applicable to financial services because of a large variety of possible product characteristics whose utility is not reflected by the purchasing price.
From an economic perspective, most financial services are categorized as credence goods. Their decisive utility is -if at all -hardly to assess because there is a distinct divergence between payment and repayment (Akerlof 1970 , Micklitz and Träger 2004 , Oehler and Werner 2008 , Oehler 2005 , 2012a , 2012b , 2013a , 2013b . As a consequence, when consumers intend to assess both the characteristics and the quality of financial services (including the advice from intermediaries), the typical asymmetries become evident. Most importantly, information asymmetries come to light which consumer policy attempts to reduce by obligating suppliers/issuers of financial services to disclose more information. For instance, by providing standardized, comparable, and comprehensive product information policy makers expect that consumers can be put in the situation to grasp the product characteristics more thoroughly.
However, since financial services are credence goods the asymmetries can only partially be reduced. And even if these asymmetries were significantly reduced, the so called 'irrationalities', 'biases', and 'heuristics' known from research in behavioral economics and finance (Kahneman and Tversky 1973 , Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 , 1981 , Oehler 1992 , Oehler and Reisch 2008 cannot be dissolved.
Most academic studies on financial literacy use data from educational programs. The evidence on the relation between financial literacy and financial decision-making, however, is rather mixed (Agarwal et al. 2007 , Martin 2007 , Yoong 2010 . Cocco et al. (2005) and van Rooij et al. (2007) show that financially uneducated investors are prone to hold no stocks and make insufficient asset-allocation decisions. 2 Lusardi and Mitchell (2005) analyze data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and find that many elderly people have low financial know-how and fail 2 Standard portfolio theory predicts that independently from their risk preference households should hold some stocks. However, Campbell (2006) finds that 60-70% of U.S. households do not at all invest in stocks. Yoong (2010) specifies explanations for the so called 'stockholding puzzle' including credit-constraints, the spread between borrowing and lending rates, transaction costs and behavioral, cognitive, cultural and social aspects. See also Hilgert et al. 2003 , Lusardi and Mitchell 2009 , Hastings and Mitchell 2010 to save enough money for their retirement. Other prominent studies support the hypothesis that financial education which is fostered by employers or high schools boost individuals' affinity to save and plan for the future (Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz 1996 , Bernheim, Garrett and Maki 2001 , Yoong, 2010 . On the contrary Cole and Shastry (2009) and Duflo and Saez (2003) find weak evidence for a positive relation between financial education programs and investor behavior. These findings indicate flaws and inconsistencies in the methodological concepts of most academic studies. In particular, when data sets from financial education programs are analyzed, questions about external validity, heterogeneity and causality arise (Yoong, 2010 , Oehler 2013b . The latter aspect is highly relevant since the efficaciousness of these education programs is influenced by two interrelations: First, it is questionable whether educational efforts have any impact on financial literacy, and second, there is no unambiguous evidence that a higher level of financial know-how actually enables individuals to make superior investment decisions.
Data and Methodological Approach
In our empirical analysis we evaluate different versions of KIDs and examine whether they meet minimum requirements in order to provide benefits for consumers. From May to July 2011 we conducted a survey among 44 graduate and 230 post-graduate finance students, respectively, by using a standardized questionnaire in order to compare and determine the utility of the KIDs. Oehler (2011) . Within the legal framework these benchmark KIDs are solely created based on the findings of consumer research and they are not influenced by the interests of financial service providers. 3 We chose finance students as subjects for this survey because we assume that they are specialists in the field of retail banking and finance who are familiar with the aforementioned products and should be able to assess the information in KIDs and compare the fact sheets with each other.
On seven occasions we handed three different KIDs for the same product out to the aforementioned students who were asked to assess the given KIDs with respect to the five criteria 'basic characteristics', 'structure and design', 'comprehensibleness', 'comparability', 'relative rank':
 In the empirical setting we particularly emphasize on the criterion 'basic characteristics'.
This criterion allows us to examine in-depth how subjects assess the explanation of the key characteristics of the given product. It consists of the following items: functioning, risks, return, associated costs, and availability of the financial product as well as portfolio effects, scenarios/alternative performance, summary of the given information. Thereby we analyze which KIDs help to increase the understanding of the products' fundamental characteristics which is particularly essential for retail investors.
 The criterion 'structure and design' is covered by the following four items. It addresses whether 1) the language used is plain, 2) the information is readable, 3) there is an appropriate amount of information and 4) the presentation is objective.
 'Comprehensibleness' of the information given: The subjects assessed whether the information provided in the KIDs is comprehensive (one item).
 'Comparability': The students assessed the KIDs' suitability to compare products (one item).
 Lastly, the students were asked to generally assess which of the three KIDs is most appropriate to make investment decisions and to rank the three given KIDs.
In each assessment session students appraised three KIDs on either one fixed deposit product (two supplier KIDs; one benchmark KID), one corporate bond (two supplier KIDs; one benchmark KID), one out of two XTFs on the German stock market index DAX (for each XTF:
one supplier KID, one KID from the issuer, one benchmark KID), or one out of two open-end real estate funds (for each fund: one supplier KID, one KID from the issuer, one benchmark KID). That is, each time and for each product two of the given three KIDs were developed by suppliers/issuers of the financial product. The other KID is the benchmark as constructed by Oehler (2011) . Subjects evaluated the given KIDs relative to each other by assigning each item one of the following values: 1 (very good), 2 (good), 3 (satisfactory), 4 (fair), 5 (insufficient).
We aggregate the values over the items for each of the five criteria. Subsequently, we compute median values for each criterion for the full sample and for each product. Furthermore, we conduct Mann-Whitney-Tests (U-test) in order to test for equality of the calculated median values. and as being nearly good (median value of 2.25) in 'structure and design', whereas 'comprehensibleness' and 'comparability' are assessed as being good (median value of 2.0).
Results and Discussion

Full Sample
These results indicate that even the newly introduced regulation of KIDs does not appear to fully reflect individuals' requirements with respect to product information on investment products. This is most obvious due to the modest assessment of the presentation in terms of the products' fundamental characteristics. Besides this, the results might also indicate that the current regulation of KIDs gives suppliers/issuers of financial services still too much space for an inappropriate framing of product information.
[Please insert 'structure and design' (median value of 2.5). Overall these less standardized KIDs appear to not adequately reflect consumer needs. Particularly, since the respondents in our study are finance students it is very likely that retail investors without substantial education in finance will find supplier/issuer KIDs even less helpful.
When the subjects are asked to rank the three KIDs relative to each other, the benchmark KIDs (KID 2) are ranked first, whereas KID 1 and KID 3 are ranked as second and third, respectively, which largely confirms results for the single criteria. The differences between the three types of KIDs are highly statistically significant. [Insert Table 2 German regulators have decided that there is no requirement to provide KIDs for apparently simple financial products. In the light of the lack of clarity with respect to several characteristics of these products, such as the determinants of the interest rate or the cost structure, it is questionably why the requirement to provide KIDs for, e.g., fixed deposits has been neglected (Oehler 2012a) . The empirical evidence in Panel E of Table 2 indicates that consumers do not feel adequately informed about fixed deposits given the KIDs found in the market. While the KIDs are mostly assessed as 'good' in terms of 'comprehensiveness' and 'comparability', they receive only the grade 'satisfactory' in the important criterion 'basic characteristics'. This is also the result for the benchmark KID, although this KID is ranked first. These results indicate that regulatory effort with respect to allegedly simple product categories is required.
Assessment of KIDs on Different Products
The evaluation of KIDs on a corporate bond provides a quite clear-cut picture as well. Compared to the benchmark KID (largely 'good' in all categories), the KIDs of the suppliers are assessed to be inferior in the criteria 'basic characteristics', 'structure and design' and 'comparability' at statistically significant levels. The overall picture is also reflected in the respective ranks of the KIDs. The differences between KID 1 and KID 3 (both suppliers) are not statistically significant which indicates that even the introduced regulation might not be adequate to improve the informational situation.
Conclusion
In our empirical analysis we evaluate different versions of key investor information documents (KIDs) and examine whether they meet minimum requirements in order to provide benefits for consumers. KIDs are fact sheets composed to describe the characteristics of financial products in a brief, standardized and straightforward manner. The documents are intended to meet similar requirements as patient information sheets or package leaflets provided by pharmaceutical manufacturers. KIDs are supposed to specify all relevant information of an investment product at a glance with regard to associated costs, benefits, risks and rewards.
Our results indicate that subjects assess KIDs of suppliers/issuers merely as moderately appropriate to grasp the key characteristics of the associated financial product. In contrast, in terms of the evaluated criteria the benchmark KIDs which are designed not only on the basis of legal requirements but also on the basis of finding from research in behavioral economics and finance, in particular with respect to consumers' ability to gather and process information, are generally evaluated as being superior to KIDs of suppliers/issuers which at best meet legal requirements. Since our subjects (finance students) are to a certain degree experts in finance we conclude that, in particular, retail investors with a lesser degree of financial sophistication will hardly benefit from supplier/issuer KIDs.
One reason for our findings might be that consumer policy fails to establish measures that protect consumers in a thorough and holistic manner. As long as consumer policy-making follows a rather neoclassical approach in assuming consumers to already be omni-competent subjects or at least to be easily brought to this ideal regulatory efforts will not meet reality. A far more promising and practice oriented approach would be to utilize and implement relevant findings from behavioral economics and finance, which have recently also been supported by finding in the area of neuro economics.
Beyond the aspects discussed in this paper, future research should include related questions such as why regulation typically only refers to the purchase of products while sales decisions, which are also very important when making portfolio adjustments, are largely neglected, or whether essential information, e.g., about inflation, liquidity and interest rate risks which is not included in the regulation on KIDs ) should be included. In addition, further attempts should be made in order to match the requirements for product information over different financial product categories such as investment and insurance products as indicated by Oehler (2012a) . 
